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CONTEXT, CHOICE, AND RIGHTS: PHS COMMUNITY 
SERVICES SOCIETY v CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
MARGOT YOUNG† 
. . . we have won a major battle 
we the most afflicted of the poor 
have won a battle . . .1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional law cases that revolve around the rights or circumstances of 
those groups most marginalized in Canadian society are not frequent cause 
for celebration.2 Typically, these cases push the boundaries of classical liberal 
understandings of the rights our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 
protects, asking the courts to recognize social and economic dimensions to 
liberties that are traditionally and popularly more narrowly construed.4 Such 
                                                                    
†  Associate Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. Thanks are owed to 
Lisa Nevens for focused research assistance on this paper, and to Sheila McIntyre and Na-
tasha Affolder for comments and collegiality. Funding for this project gratefully acknowl-
edged from the Reconceiving Human Rights Practice for the New Social Rights Paradigm 
project, Community University Research Alliance, SSHRCC. 
1  Bud Osborn, “A New Day” in Signs of the Times (Vancouver: Paneficio Studios and Anvil 
Press, 2005) at 42. This poem was read by Osborn at the opening of Vancouver’s Insite. 
2  See especially Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 SCR 429 
[Gosselin]; Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter, “Socio-Economic Rights under the Cana-
dian Charter” in Malcolm Langford, ed, Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in 
International and Comparative Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 209. 
3  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 
1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
4  Sandra Fredman has written of social and economic rights as “the Cinderella” of human 
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demands are more often than not sidestepped (or rejected outright) by 
courts, with the result that activist agendas focusing on leveraging Charter 
rights to achieve significant social change are less compelling than initially 
imagined.5 It is simply not clear that the turn to courts as a strategy of social, 
political, and economic transformation is the best use of sparse resources. 
However, a recent case out of British Columbia—PHS Community Ser-
vices Society v Canada (Attorney General)6—complicates simple political as-
sessment of the relationship between rights litigation and social struggle. 
This case brings together two separate actions,7 each challenging the consti-
tutional ability of the federal government to criminalize supervised safe in-
jection of prohibited drugs in a provincially established safe injection site—
Insite, located in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside (“DTES”). Challengers to 
federal criminalization were successful at both the British Columbia Su-
preme Court and Court of Appeal. Leave to appeal has been granted at the 
Supreme Court of Canada.8 The case engages a wide swath of constitutional 
issues: legal rights under the Charter and interesting (albeit at times obtuse) 
division of powers arguments about interjurisdictional immunity and federal 
paramountcy. 
Assessment of constitutional challenges and their relevance to progressive 
political struggle remains fraught, despite the clear success, at least up to the 
Court of Appeal level, of the rights claimants in PHS. The acknowledgment, 
particularly at the trial level, of the complexity and reality of injection drug 
                                                                                                                                               
rights. See Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2008) at 2. 
5  See generally Margot Young, “Why Rights Now: Law and Desperation” in Margot Young 
et al, eds, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2007) 317; Sanda Rodgers & Sheila McIntyre, “Introduction” in Sanda Rodgers & Sheila 
McIntyre, eds, The Supreme Court of Canada and Social Justice: Commitment, Retrench-
ment or Retreat (Canada: LexisNexis Canada, 2010) xxv; Martha Jackman, “Constitu-
tional Castaways: Poverty and the McLachlin Court” in Rodgers & McIntyre, ibid, 297. 
6  2010 BCCA 15, 314 DLR (4th) 209 [PHS (CA)]. 
7  2008 BCSC 661, 293 DLR (4th) 392, aff ’d PHS (CA), supra note 6; 2008 BCSC 1453, 
302 DLR (4th) 740, aff ’d PHS (CA), supra note 6. 
8  2010 CanLII 34800. The case is scheduled to be heard by the SCC on 12 May 2011. 
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addiction and health care treatment for such addiction is important and 
noteworthy. Judicial analysis employed recognition of a complex and socially 
evolving set of conceptions about the activities—supervised injection and 
drug addiction—pertinent to Insite. This narrative clearly comes out of the 
local community’s struggle against hegemonic understandings of the margin-
alized individuals involved and their needs. This raises an interesting oppor-
tunity for scholarly observations about the connection (or disconnection) 
between social activism and legal action, and the effect of this case on pro-
gressive local politics about drug addiction and treatment for addicts. 
This is not to over-emphasize or over-credit the transformative aspect of 
the judgment texts at both levels of court in PHS. While the case is, so far, a 
victory for the rights claimants, I argue that the manner in which the way was 
cleared for that victory may compromise or constrain future constitutional 
arguments. The framing of the reality at issue and its relevance to the un-
packing of the Charter’s section 7 rights, retains too narrow a scope for these 
rights to be positioned as reliable triggers for progressive social transforma-
tion. 
That said, the case is nonetheless important as a reminder of the attention 
due local urbanized political struggle. Vancouver, certainly, is a city character-
ized by what one writer has called the “new dynamics of inequality.”9 Nicho-
las Blomley elaborates, writing of the urban “valorization of certain spaces 
and people, and the simultaneous but interlocking devalorization of those 
deemed marginal, such as immigrants and the urban poor.”10 The setting of 
the case and the people whose lives and issues animate the struggle over Insite 
illustrate this well. Consequently, the broader issue of diversity—the topic of 
this issue of the UBC Law Review—has a more focused expression in the 
                                                                    
9  Saskia Sassen, “The Global City: Strategic Site/New Frontier” in Engin Isin, ed, Democ-
racy, Citizenship and the Global City (New York: Routledge, 2000) 48 at 52, quoted in 
Nicolas Blomley, Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property (New York: 
Routledge, 2004) at 31 [Blomley, Unsettling the City]. Vancouver, of course, is not unique 
in this. For a journalistic account of a similar phenomenon in Toronto, see Anna Mehler 
Paperny, “Toronto a city of extremes, losing the middle ground” The Globe and Mail (15 
December 2010) A1. 
10  Blomley, Unsettling the City, supra note 9 at 31. 
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underlying politics that lead up to, account for, and are affected by the PHS 
case. As a political artifact, the case is a piece of a larger campaign to make 
Vancouver more responsive to and reflective of the needs of its citizenry—
especially those at the margins, underrepresented in the control and focus of 
public and private social spaces of the city. 
This essay has three sections that follow. First, it begins by providing 
some context to the case, telling a selective story about the area (the DTES) 
and the facility (Insite) that have spawned the lawsuit. Second, it looks at the 
two decisions so far rendered in the case, at the section 7 bases of the judg-
ments at each level of court, and at the linkage of legal argument and contex-
tual factors key to the outcomes that relate to section 7. While the case also 
entails division of powers arguments for interjurisdictional immunity and 
federal paramountcy, these aspects are not considered. Finally, the essay con-
siders how decisions, so positive in outcome for the rights claimants in this 
case, could nonetheless cast a shadow on possible future cases representing 
the interests of low-income or disadvantaged plaintiffs. It concludes with a 
caution. The rejection of individual agency as relevant to resolution of the 
rights issue in this case demands broader principled extension to all rights 
analysis. A commitment to social justice and substantive equality demands 
no less. 
II. THE DTES AND INSITE: HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
PHS presents a legal moment in a much longer and more complex social and 
political struggle over the rights and life chances of groups significantly mar-
ginalized and disadvantaged in Canadian society generally and in the urban 
life of Vancouver in particular. The case, and the legal challenges that initi-
ated it, took this struggle from the municipal and local political arena into 
the legal forum. The story of Insite has been described as “a complex and 
interconnected series of events brought about by the activities of advocates, 
peers, community agencies, politicians, journalists, [and] academics”.11 The 
drama must now also assign key roles to lawyers and the judiciary. 
                                                                    
11  Dan Small, Anita Palepu & Mark W Tyndall, “The Establishment of North America’s 
First State Sanctioned Supervised Injection Facility: A Case Study in Culture Change” 
(2006) 17 Int’l J Drug Policy 73. 
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Insite was opened on 12 September 2003 by the Vancouver Coastal 
Health Authority (“Health Authority”), in partnership with the Portland 
Hotel Society.12 The site responds to injection drug-related issues in Vancou-
ver’s DTES.13 While there are today over 75 supervised injection sites operat-
ing around the world, Vancouver is the only municipality on the continent 
with a government-sanctioned safe injection site (“SIS”).14 The injection 
clinic provides a range of services to injection drug users, including clean 
needles and a safe and supervised place to inject drugs.15 
                                                                    
12  The Portland Hotel Society operates Insite under a contractual arrangement with the 
Vancouver Coastal Health Authority. The program was supported by the Vancouver Po-
lice Department, the City of Vancouver, the Province of British Columbia, injection drug 
users, community groups, academic institutions, and others. As an aside, it is interesting 
to note that the Dr Peter AIDS Foundation, an HIV/AIDS health care facility in Van-
couver, has for some time allowed its registered nurses to provide supervised injection ser-
vices without a ministerial exemption. The Dr Peter AIDS Foundation is a non-profit 
registered charity, funded though various government health and housing agencies with 
the purpose of assisting and caring for persons who are poor or needy and who suffer from 
HIV/AIDS. The Foundation argues that these supervised injection services are part of 
the primary health care it provides to its clients. 
13  Insite provides a number of services. Specifically, it is staffed by a combination of clinical 
and non-clinical staff, including peers, program assistants, RNs, alcohol and drug counsel-
lors and coordinators. It is open 18 hours a day, seven days a week, from 10 AM to 4 AM. 
Its injection room has 12 booths with a daily capacity of roughly 850 injections. Drugs 
are not provided and injections are supervised with emergency response to overdoses 
available. The staff offers immunization, wound care, and injection-related first aid. Re-
ferrals to addiction treatment and other health services are available, accompanied by ac-
cess to sterile injection equipment. Insite provides a post-injection space for observation 
and peer interaction. See Vancouver Coastal Health, “Saving Lives: Vancouver’s Super-
vised Injection Site” (brochure) at 2, online: Legislative Assembly of British Columbia 
<http://www.llbc.leg.bc.ca/public/pubdocs/bcdocs/458493/insite_brochure.pdf>. 
14  British Columbia, Ministry of Healthy Living and Sport, “North America’s First Super-
vised Injection Site” (1 February 2010), online: <http://www.housingmattersbc.ca/ 
docs/dtes_insite.pdf>. The Netherlands, for example, opened several sites in the 1970s. A 
site in Zurich in 2003 also had a restaurant employing addicts, a laundromat, public com-
puters, and a medical team to attend clients. As well, it had a supervised inhalation room. 
See Larry Campbell, Neil Boyd & Lori Culbert, A Thousand Dreams: Vancouver’s Down-
town Eastside and the Fight for Its Future (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 2009) at 177–78. 
15  Ibid. 
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Insite runs on a harm reduction model. The program is directed “towards 
decreasing the adverse health, social and economic consequences of drug use 
without requiring abstinence from drug use.”16 The substances brought to 
Insite by drug users are prohibited, have been obtained illegally, and are in 
the possession of Insite clients before entering the facility. Roughly 60 per 
cent of the drugs injected are opioids, two-thirds of which are heroin and 
one-third of which is morphine or hydromorphone. The remainder, ap-
proximately 40 per cent of injected drugs, are stimulants, of which 90 per 
cent are cocaine and 10 per cent are methamphetamine.17 
The DTES is one of the most impoverished urban neighbourhoods in 
Canada.18 The area lies just east of the Vancouver’s downtown core19 and is 
intriguingly described by geographer Nicholas Blomley as produced by “a 
complicated and fractured geologic layering of material and representational 
processes”.20 The social history of the DTES is complex, with different 
groups of peoples and different eras of use shaping and reflected in the 
neighbourhood of today. First Nations peoples historically occupied and 
used the land now known as the DTES, setting up summer camps, villages, 
and fishing settlements since time immemorial on the territory.21 Aboriginal 
peoples still represent a significant percentage of inhabitants. European colo-
nization came in the early 1800s, bringing fur traders and entrepreneurs into 
the city, transforming the area into a key economic piece of the frontier city 
of Vancouver. The years leading up to the two world wars saw the area popu-
lated by seasonal workers seeking inexpensive rental accommodation. After 
                                                                    
16  Vancouver Coastal Health, Insite—Supervised Injection Site (7 November 2010), online: 
<http://supervisedinjection.vch.ca>. For a fuller description of services and protocols at 
Insite, see PHS Community Services Society v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 BCSC 
661 at paras 71–77, 293 DLR (4th) 392 [PHS (SC)]. 
17  See PHS (SC), ibid at para 72. 
18  See generally Campbell, Boyd & Culbert, supra note 14. 
19  The BCSC judgment establishes the DTES as: “bounded by the waterfront along Bur-
rard Inlet on the north, Clark Drive on the east, Pender and Terminal Streets on the 
south, and Richards Street on the west” (PHS (SC), supra note 16 at para 15). 
20  Blomley, Unsettling the City, supra note 9 at 32. 
21  See ibid. 
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World War II, these housing units became permanent homes for older single 
male workers, retired from the resource industry. Demographics further 
shifted as the development of an emergent business district in the west side 
of Vancouver drew away more affluent residents and business.22 
Currently, the DTES is home to a large low-income population.23 Indeed, 
the DTES represents the increasing polarization of cities around the world 
as, in the words of David Harvey, “divided and conflict-prone”24 areas. The 
median household income in the DTES is well below that of the municipal 
average: $12 thousand in 1996 compared to $48 thousand.25 Over 4,600 
intravenous drug users reside in the DTES, close to one-half of those in Van-
couver as a whole.26 About five per cent of the users in the DTES use Insite.27 
The area is known for its lack of adequate housing, many single-room occu-
pancy hotels, and a large number of vulnerable people including urban Abo-
riginals and individuals with mental illnesses.28 This inequality is “etched on 
the spatial forms”29 of the area and surrounding districts: single-room occu-
pancy hotels, bars, and run-down buildings line the streets. As the PHS (SC) 
judgment notes, in 2008, 87 per cent of drug users in the DTES had Hepati-
tis C, 17 per cent had HIV, 20 per cent were homeless, 80 per cent had been 
incarcerated, and 38 per cent were involved in prostitution.30 Poverty is pal-
                                                                    
22  See Susan Boyd, Donald MacPherson & Bud Osborne, Raise Shit!: Social Action Saving 
Lives (Halifax: Fernwood Publising, 2009) at 11. 
23  See ibid at 34. 
24  David Harvey, “The Right To The City” (2008) 53 New Left Review 23 at 32. See also 
Jeff Sommers & Nick Blomley, “The Worst Block in Vancouver” in Stan Douglas, Every 
Building on 100 West Hastings (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2002) 18. 
25  See PHS (SC), supra note 16 at para 15. 
26  See PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 249. 
27  See ibid. 
28  See PHS (SC), supra note 16 at para 15. 
29  Harvey, supra note 24 at 32. 
30  See PHS (SC), supra note 16 at para 16. See also Martha Lewis et al, Downtown Eastside 
Demographic Study of SRO and Social Housing Tenants (Vancouver: City of Vancouver, 
BC Housing, and the Vancouver Agreement, 2008) at 2, online: <http://vancouver.ca/ 
commsvcs/housing/pdf/dtesdemographic08apr.pdf>. 
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pable: people sleeping on the streets, open injection of heroin and smoking 
of crack, and many individuals simply hanging about.31 The “visible street 
scene in the DTES is directly related to poverty, gentrification and lack of 
access to private space.”32 
The DTES is also an area known for “a long history of activism and op-
position” and the assertion of community and rights in the face of condem-
nation as marginal and anomic.33 In this sense, it is a contested landscape.34 
Many of those outside the area share an understanding of the DTES as dere-
lict and a place of suffering, dysfunction, and dislocation. But many inhabi-
tants understand the DTES to be their chosen community, an area where 
they enjoy a high degree of acceptance and manageability. Thus the DTES is 
a neighbourhood with a strong counter-narrative of place and belonging. 
The struggle for Insite emerges from this latter perspective, from strate-
gies employed by residents and activists to establish a facility that responds to 
the high density of injection drug users with no safe place to inject the drugs 
to which they are addicted, and with limited, if any, access to clean and safe 
injection equipment. Insite is the product of concerted efforts to reshape the 
DTES to better reflect and serve its inhabitants and their uniquely concen-
trated needs and circumstances. Insite thus invokes a tale of “early commu-
nity activism that culminated in a social justice movement that exposed the 
harms of prohibition and rallied to open the first official safe injection site.”35 
The story of the choice of the location of Insite, told in a recent book on 
the DTES,36 illustrates the importance of local activism and effort. Two su-
                                                                    
31  See Robert Tarantino, “Creating Conflict: Legal Strategies for Housing the Homeless in 
Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside” (2010) 28 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 109 at 112. 
32  Boyd, MacPherson & Osborne, supra note 22 at 12. 
33  Nicholas Blomley, “Enclosure, Common Right and the Property of the Poor” (2008) 17 
Soc & Leg Stud 311 at 312. Blomley refers to activism around issues of land, redevelop-
ment, and gentrification, but his characterization is equally true in reference to poverty 
and drug use issues. 
34  See Blomley, Unsettling the City, supra note 9 at 53. 
35  Boyd, MacPherson & Osborne, supra note 22 at 17. See this book more generally for a 
detailed discussion of specific actions. 
36  This tale is closely taken from Campbell, Boyd & Culbert, supra note 14 at 173–77. 
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pervised injection site supporters, Dan Small and Mark Townsend,37 out for a 
walk in the area met a man sweeping the sidewalk in front of a sandwich 
shop along Hastings Street. For 22 years, this man and his wife had run the 
sandwich shop, living above the store front in a second-floor apartment and 
renting out the remainder of the building to hard-to-house tenants. Conver-
sations ensued and ultimately the Portland Hotel Society38 obtained a lease 
to the building on the understanding that a supervised injection site would 
open there. The sandwich shop closed and the Society spent $30 thousand 
renovating the 1,200 square foot ground floor.39 The renovation project, 
code-named “the hair salon,” was ready for opening in 2002, even without 
government support, when Larry Campbell, a local figure and a supporter of 
the supervised injection site, announced his candidacy for mayor. Organizers 
decided to wait for election results, hoping for government support—at least 
at the municipal level. But even without this support they had numerous 
healthcare professionals, activists, social services workers, and addicts waiting 
and “ready to act on a moment’s notice” to staff the facility.40 
Municipal government support came quickly, pointedly in the form of a 
commitment from Larry Campbell during his mayoral campaign to open a 
safe injection site by 1 January 2003.41 Toward the end of his term, outgoing 
mayor Phillip Owen had also become a supporter of a SIS. When Larry 
Campbell was elected mayor of Vancouver on 16 November 2002, the elec-
tion brought in a city council with a majority of members from the same po-
                                                                    
37  Mark Townsend and Dan Hall work with the Portland Hotel Society. The Portland Ho-
tel Services Society is a non-profit and registered charity organized with the purpose to 
provide housing and support to individuals in Vancouver’s DTES. The individuals on 
whom its services are focused are those with the general description of “hard to house, 
hard to reach or hard to treat” (PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 4). 
38  See ibid. 
39  Apparently, the space was also renovated to include an inhalation room for addicts who 
smoked drugs, featuring a negative-air circulation system. However, the inhalation room 
has not been opened, although need for such a site is recognized. See Campbell, Boyd & 
Culbert, supra note 14 at 178. 
40  Small, Palepu & Tyndall, supra note 11 at 78. 
41  See Campbell, Boyd & Culbert, supra note 14 at 174. 
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litical party.42 But Campbell’s electoral promise proved naïve, and by April 
2003 not much progress had been made. Although, as we learn from affidavit 
evidence, the Vancouver Richmond Health Board voted at a June 2001 board 
meeting to support SISs as “a vital and necessary part of the continuum of 
the health care system.”43 And, in March 2003, the Health Authority ap-
proved a proposal for a safe injection site and authorized an application to 
Health Canada for an exemption from the prohibition of such a site.44 
On 7 April 2003, a number of activists, most notably Ann Livingston,45 
opened an illegal injection site at 327 Carrall Street in the DTES. This was 
Livingston’s third illegal facility and the purpose of the site “was to put pres-
sure on the government to approve the official site.”46 The illegal site had two 
injection booths and provided clean needles and sterile water with a regular 
client base of about 50 users. The police knew of the site, monitoring it but 
not shutting it down.47 The illegal site stayed open for about six months, clos-
ing when the official site opened in September 2003, in the former sandwich 
shop.48 
Six hundred addicts came through Insite on the first day. The average 
now is between 700 and 1,000 daily.49 In 2004, the Portland Hotel Society 
took over the whole building and expanded the facilities by including a 
twelve-bed detox unit called Onsite on the second floor and a recovery wing 
on the third floor for people waiting to get into long-term treatment.50 
                                                                    
42  COPE took eight out of ten city council seats. 
43  PHS (SC), supra note 16 at para 44. 
44  See PHS (SC), supra note 16 at para 45. 
45  Ann Livingston is a long-term activist in the DTES and co-founder of the Vancouver 
Area Network of Drug Users (“VANDU”). 
46  Ann Livingston, quoted in Campbell, Boyd & Culbert, supra note 14 at 180–81. 
47  See Campbell, Boyd & Culbert, supra note 14 at 181. 
48  See ibid at 182. See also Boyd, MacPherson & Osborne, supra note 22 at 180. 
49  See ibid at 183. 
50  See ibid at 184. 
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III. THE CASE 
The legal regime under which Insite operates was, up to this case, a product 
of both federal and provincial law. Insite is set up under exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction over health care and health care facilities.51 A wide range of pro-
vincial statutes are relevant to the Health Authority’s establishment of In-
site.52 The trial judge found on undisputed evidence that supervised injection 
is “a vital part of a provincial health care undertaking”.53 But supervised injec-
tion is also caught within a federal prohibitory regime. Sections 4 and 5 of 
the federal Controlled Drugs and Substances Act54 criminalize possession of 
and trafficking in controlled substances. Appendices I to IV of the CDSA set 
out what substances are “controlled,” and include such drugs as heroin and 
cocaine.55 On their face, these sections apply to the activities of both users 
and staff at Insite. However, the statutory regime allows for exemptions from 
such wide criminalization. Section 56 of the CDSA provides for the federal 
minister of health to grant exemptions from application of any provision of 
the Act. According to this section, an exemption can be granted if “in the 
opinion of the Minister, the exemption is necessary for a medical or scientific 
purpose or is otherwise in the public interest.”56 But, under this federal statu-
tory regime, absent a ministerially-granted exemption, users and staff of In-
site are liable to prosecution. 
Insite received an initial three-year ministerial exemption under section 
56 of the CDSA from sections 4 and 5 for both drug users and staff within 
Insite’s premises, commencing 12 September 2003.57 The initial exemption 
                                                                    
51  See PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 103. Huddart JA points to subsection 92(7) in par-
ticular. 
52  See ibid at paras 104–06. 
53  Ibid at para 102. 
54  SC 1996, c 19 [CDSA]. 
55  Ibid. 
56  The full section reads: “The Minister may, on such terms and conditions as the Minister 
deems necessary, exempt any person or class of persons or any controlled substance or pre-
cursor or any class . . .” (ibid, s 56). 
57  The initial exemptions were based on necessity for a scientific purpose. For excerpts from 
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reflected the 2002 conclusion of the report of the House of Commons Spe-
cial Committee on the Non-Medical Use of Drugs that the DTES presented 
a “public health disaster.”58 The creation of a safe injection facility would, the 
committee argued, allow scientific assessment and evaluation of the harm 
reduction option.59 This two section exemption was extended by the minister 
to 31 December 2007, and then to 30 June 2008. Thus, the federal and pro-
vincial governments orchestrated for some time a form of coexistence and 
cooperation between the federal and provincial regimes that enabled the op-
eration of Insite. However, after the February 2006 election of the Conserva-
tive government under Stephen Harper, cooperation became attenuated and 
extension of the exemption unlikely. Apparent federal political unwillingness 
to further extend the exemption led a number of supporters of Insite to seek 
a judicial remedy to the growing threat of illegality under the federal statute. 
This aspect of Insite’s story highlights, at least through contrast, a key fea-
ture of modern Canadian federalism. Gerald Baier, a Canadian political sci-
entist, notes that executive negotiation, rather than litigation, has become the 
preferred method of resolving jurisprudential conflicts in modern Canadian 
federalism.60 Much of what actually structures the nature of current federal-
ism, he argues, is political, rather than judicial. The formal textual division of 
powers between federal and provincial governments and actual judicial doc-
trine under our constitutional texts are simply less informative about the state 
of the federal union than the actual practical outcome of extrajudicial inter-
                                                                                                                                               
the exemption letter, see PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 81. 
58  House of Commons, Special Committee on Non-Medical Use of Drugs, Policy for the 
New Millennium: Working Together to Redefine Canada’s Drug Strategy (December 2002) 
at 61 (Chair: Paddy Torsney), online: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/ 
Committee/372/SNUD/Reports/RP1032297/snudrp02/snudrp02-e.pdf> [Committee 
Report], quoted in PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 73. 
59  See Committee Report, supra note 58 at 88. 
60  See Gerald Baier, Courts and Federalism: Judicial Doctrine in the United States, Australia, 
and Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) at 9. See also, in reference to executive inter-
governmental agreement as a feature of modern Canadian federalism, Barbara Cameron, 
“Accounting for Rights and Money in the Canadian Social Union” in Young et al, supra 
note 5, 162. 
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governmental negotiation.61 But this model breaks down when there is dis-
agreement over desirable policy directions between the federal and provin-
cial governments. And this, of course, is a recent key feature of the story of 
Insite, with the consequent emergence of judicial decision making as the 
primary shaper of the relevant constitutional landscape with respect to the 
SIS. 
This fracturing of federal/provincial cooperation did not go judicially 
unnoticed. At the BCCA, Huddart JA expressed regret that the cooperative 
executive federalism that had facilitated the opening of Insite had disinte-
grated. Huddart JA observed that the federal executive’s concern to protect 
its jurisdiction to prohibit possession and use of scheduled drugs had “over-
taken respect for difficult decisions made by British Columbia.”62 Her com-
ments rue the failure of “respectful federal and provincial co-operation”,63 a 
failure that, in this case, made judicial intervention necessary. 
To repeat, then, the politically generated uncertainty of Insite’s legal 
status, the failure of intergovernmental accommodation, ultimately resulted 
in the initiation of two actions before the BCSC.64 One was brought by the 
Portland Hotel Services Community Services Society and another by indi-
viduals representing the Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users 
(“VANDU”).65 Together, these plaintiffs asked for a number of declaratory 
remedies with the shared goal of allowing Insite to continue its activities im-
                                                                    
61  See ibid. 
62  PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 92. 
63  Ibid at para 93. 
64  For more detailed chronology of the actions, see ibid at paras 82–83. 
65  The plaintiffs were two residents of the DTES and representative users of Insite. As the 
BCCA judgment of Rowles JA details, one is an injection drug user addicted to heroin 
for approximately 38 years, with Hepatitis C as a result of this injection drug use. The 
other had long been addicted to illicit drugs. This claimant also had Hepatitis C (see ibid 
at para 12). VANDU is a drug user organization well-recognized internationally and is a 
non-profit society with the primary purpose of advocating on the behalf of drug users in 
order to increase the ability of addicts to live healthy lives. The organization started in 
1997 as a means to address the health crisis in the DTES among local injection drug users. 
See Thomas Kerr et al, “Harm reduction by a ‘user-run’ organization: A case study of the 
Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users” (2006) 17 Int’l J Drug Policy 61 at 62. 
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mune from potential criminalization under the CDSA. More specifically, the 
Portland Hotel Society asked that the Court declare that Insite is a health 
care undertaking, authority for the operation of which lies with the province, 
and that federal constitutional power to legislate with respect to criminal law 
cannot interfere with the provincial constitutional power over this aspect of 
health care because of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. The Port-
land Hotel Society also pleaded that subsections 4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA 
are unconstitutional and should be struck down because they deprive persons 
addicted to one or more controlled substances of access to health care at In-
site and therefore violate the rights conferred by section 7 of the Charter. 
The individual VANDU plaintiffs sought a number of specific declara-
tions. They argued that the activities undertaken by staff and volunteers at 
Insite do not violate sections 4 and 5 of the CDSA and that the CDSA and 
its regulations do not apply to the medical treatment at Insite of persons ad-
dicted to a controlled substance. They also argued that the offence of the 
possession of all addictive drugs as set out in the CDSA violates section 7 of 
the Charter and that section 56 of the CDSA which vests an unfettered dis-
cretion in the minister to grant an exemption from the provisions of the 
CDSA is unconstitutional. 
The commonality across these issues resulted in the two actions being 
heard together, with trial for both beginning on 30 June 2008.66 The range of 
issues as articulated in the two sets of pleadings, boiled down to a small 
number of key questions considered by the trial judge: the validity of sub-
sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA; and the operability and application of 
the CDSA to the staff and users of Insite. The Attorney General of Canada 
opposed the granting of relief on any of these issues.67 Pitfield J heard the case 
at the trial court level and accepted the section 7 argument but not the inter-
jurisdictional immunity argument.68 As a remedy, Pitfield J issued a sus-
                                                                    
66  The British Columbia Attorney General appeared as a party under section 8 of the Con-
stitutional Questions Act, RSBC 1996, c 68. The Vancouver Coastal Health Authority ob-
tained intervenor status. Both of these parties argued in favour of the claimants on the di-
vision of powers issues. 
67  For more specific detailing of Canada’s opposition, see PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 15. 
68  The trial judge refused to rule one way or the other on the issue of statutory application of 
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pended declaration of invalidity with the proviso that during the suspension 
Insite would be constitutionally immune from application of subsections 
4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA. The result, then, after the trial, was the constitu-
tional invalidity of the CDSA as it applied to Insite.69 
Both sides appealed aspects of this decision. The Portland Hotel Society 
argued that the trial court had erred in failing to find interjurisdictional im-
munity for provincial jurisdiction involved in setting up Insite and that the 
trial court had erred in dismissing the argument for the unconstitutionality 
of section 56 of the CDSA. The federal government contested the trial 
court’s finding that subsections 4(1) and 5(1) were unconstitutional. Three 
organizations applied for leave to intervene at the Court of Appeal hearing: 
the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, the Dr Peter AIDS Foundation, 
and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (“BCCLA”). Applica-
tion by the BCCLA was not opposed, but the Attorney General of Canada 
opposed the applications of the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and the 
Dr Peter AIDS Foundation. Leave to intervene was granted to all.70 
At the BCCA, two judges—Madame Justices Rowles and Huddart—
found for the claimants in terms of both the section 7 and the interjurisdic-
tional immunity argument, with the interjurisdictional immunity finding 
taking precedence. The result, pending appeal at the Supreme Court of Can-
ada, was that subsections 4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA do not apply to Insite 
but are in full force everywhere else.71 Madame Justice Smith rejected the 
claimants’ section 7 and interjurisdictional immunity arguments, finding 
instead that application of federal paramountcy was appropriate. The dis-
senting judgment thus would have rendered the provincial legal regime at 
issue in conflict with valid and applicable federal legislation, with the result 
                                                                                                                                               
possession or trafficking provisions to Insite staff. PHS (SC), supra note 16 at paras 90–
98. The issue of paramountcy was also not a feature of the judgment. 
69  The trial judge declared subsections 4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA constitutionally invalid 
but suspended the application of the order for twelve months. A constitutional exemption 
was granted to Insite for the duration of the suspension. 
70  See the Court of Appeal’s preliminary decision on leave to intervene: PHS Community 
Services Society v Attorney General of Canada, 2008 BCCA 441 (available on CanLII). 
71  See PHS (CA), supra note 6 (Court Order). 
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that criminalization of supervised injection would have been left intact and 
provincial legislation establishing a SIS rendered inoperative.72 
IV. SECTION 7 
I turn now to the major doctrinal preoccupation of this essay—the Court’s 
treatment of section 7. I discuss this aspect of the case for two reasons. First, I 
am interested in it because of the judgment’s clear demonstration of the im-
portance of context to section 7 analyses. And, second, I argue that this very 
contextual argument, while facilitating the finding of a section 7 infringe-
ment in this case, raises troubling questions about the future course of sec-
tion 7. 
Section 7, increasingly the site of contestations over social and economic 
entitlements, states that: 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fun-
damental justice.73 
The section protects three distinct and separate interests—life, liberty, and 
security of the person—and application of these rights has been held to entail 
two stages of analysis: first, whether or not any of the three individual rights 
has been infringed; and, second, whether or not such infringement accords 
with the principles of fundamental justice.74 The scope of section 7 is, as 
Smith JA at the BCCA in this case noted, “unsettled.”75 In the Supreme 
Court of Canada decision Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General),76 Justices 
Binnie and LeBel argued that application of section 7 should be cautious and 
incremental.77 In Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), Chief Justice 
                                                                    
72  See PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 306, Smith JA. 
73  Charter, supra note 3. 
74  See e.g. Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 
SCR 307. 
75  PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 248. 
76  2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791. 
77  Ibid at para 193. 
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McLachlin similarly stated that “the meaning of [section] 7 . . . should be 
allowed to develop incrementally.”78 In that judgment, McLachlin CJ further 
argued that “[i]t would be a mistake to regard [section] 7 as frozen, or its 
content as having been exhaustively defined in previous cases.”79 The result 
has been that section 7 has been invoked in a broad range of claims and its 
ultimate import has yet to be determined, making it compelling but uncer-
tain terrain for those who wish to push forward ambitious rights claims. In 
particular, those seeking to expand opportunities for recognition of social 
and economic rights in the Charter are attentive to, and hopeful about, this 
judicially retained, albeit cautiously framed, open potential of section 7.80 
In this case the plaintiffs’ arguments about section 7 hinged on the claim 
that subsections 4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA prevented access to essential 
healthcare services for drug addicts—healthcare services that reduced or 
eliminated the risk of overdose and infectious diseases—and made addicts 
risk incarceration to obtain such services. As such, they argued these sections 
of the CDSA infringe all three of the section 7 rights, breach principles of 
fundamental justice, and are not justifiable under section 1 of the Charter. 
Canada’s response was that there is no constitutional right to the non-
medical injection of hard drugs, and that “the unbridled injection of illegal 
[d]rugs, the activity at the SIS,”81 is not medical treatment for drug addiction. 
Consequently, the federal government argued, the resulting prohibited access 
to safe injection sites such as Insite is not an infringement of section 7.82 
This essay has, of course, already revealed that the claimants were success-
ful. The BCSC held that both stages of section 7 were met, in relation to 
both sections of the CDSA, and that the resulting infringements of section 7 
were not justifiable under section 1 of the Charter. This finding was upheld 
                                                                    
78  Gosselin, supra note 2 at para 79. 
79  Ibid at para 82. 
80  See e.g. Bruce Porter, “Claiming Adjudicative Space: Social Rights, Equality, and Citizen-
ship” in Young et al, supra note 5, 77. 
81  PHS (SC), supra note 16 (Memorandum of Argument of the Attorney General of Can-
ada at para 125). 
82  See ibid. 
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by two of the three judges on appeal—Madame Justices Rowles and Hud-
dart.83 But I want to consider the contextual overlay established by the trial 
judge and how it makes possible the success of the section 7 arguments of the 
rights claimants both at trial and on appeal. That context figured to this ex-
tent is laudatory. Charter issues need to be grounded in the richness of the 
claimants’ circumstances.84 Yet the actual factors recognized and the import 
assigned to them leads to the reservations this argument expounds about 
doctrinal development of section 7. 
Considerable discussion at the trial level is taken up with the social and 
medical context surrounding the circumstances of Insite’s creation and its 
geographic location and focus of service.85 The Court considered “numerous 
government reports and action plans, individual affidavits regarding the de-
velopment and operation of Insite, affidavits about the experiences of the 
individual parties, expert affidavits relating to the nature of addiction and 
expert evidence relating to the outcomes of Insite.”86 It is a discussion critical 
to the outcome of the case: the finding of a section 7 infringement rested on 
a number of key findings of fact, three of which the trial judge termed “in-
                                                                    
83  The third judge, Madame Justice Smith, found an infringement of the interests protected 
under section 7, but went on to hold that such infringement was in accord with the prin-
ciples of fundamental justice. 
84  For discussion critical of judicial failure to do this, see Dianne Pothier, “But It’s for Your 
Own Good” in Young et al, supra note 5, 40; and Martha Jackman, “Reality checks: Pre-
suming Innocence and Proving Guilt in Charter Welfare Cases” in Young et al, supra note 
5, 23. 
85  PHS (SC), supra note 16 at paras13–46. Extensive affidavit evidence was put before the 
courts. The Attorney General of Canada initially objected to a summary trial on affida-
vits, arguing instead for in-court testimony, based on the complexity of evidence, appear-
ance of material conflict in affidavits, and importance of issues. The Court decided to 
consider the affidavit evidence first and then, should Canada renew its objections, at that 
point the Court would consider the application. After eight days of hearing, counsel for 
Canada withdrew objections to a summary trial, provided that the Court not make find-
ings of fact on matters of science on which evidence was in conflict. See PHS (SC), supra 
note 16 at paras 11–12. 
86  Catherine Bois Parker, “Update on Section 7: How the Other Half is Fighting to Stay 
Warm” (2010) 23 Can J Admin L & Prac 165 at 173. 
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controvertible,”87 and all of which are “central” to the issues raised.88 Five 
groups of contextual detail are elaborated by Pitfield J: the DTES and the 
origin of Insite, the nature of addiction, the evidence of the two VANDU 
plaintiffs (both injection drug users), the operation of Insite, and assessment 
of outcomes at Insite. The discussion of these factors—collectively termed 
the “Historical and Operating Context”—is lengthy. At the BCCA, Rowles 
JA termed the evidence supporting these factual conclusions “overwhelm-
ing.”89 Out of this thicket of political, social, and policy history emerged a 
number of crucial holdings. 
First, addiction is an illness. The government lawyer, John Hunter, QC, 
made a significant acknowledgment during oral argument at the BCSC, stat-
ing that government was in agreement that addiction was an illness.90 This 
was a key concession, as it enabled the discourse of health and health care to 
predominate. Second, communicable diseases such as Hepatitis C or 
HIV/AIDS are not caused by the introduction into the bloodstream by in-
jection of controlled substances such as heroin and cocaine. Rather, use of 
unsanitary equipment, techniques, and procedures for injection allows 
transmission of such infections, illnesses, diseases from one individual to an-
other.91 Third, risks of morbidity and mortality associated with addiction 
and injection is lessened by injection supervised by qualified health profes-
sionals.92 Fourth, Insite is a health care facility.93 “All of the services provided 
to addicts at Insite constitute health care.”94 And fifth, the situation addicts 
face is the result of a range of: 
personal, governmental and legal factors: a mixture of genetic, psychological, 
sociological and familial problems; the inability, despite serious and pro-
                                                                    
87  PHS (SC), supra note 16 at para 87. 
88  Ibid at para 13. 
89  PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 36. 
90  See ibid at para 88. 
91  See PHS (SC), supra note 16 at para 87. 
92  See ibid. 
93  See PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 134. 
94  Ibid at para 27. 
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longed efforts, of municipal, provincial and federal governments, as well as 
numerous non-profit organizations, to provide meaningful and effective 
support and solutions; and the failure of the criminal law to prevent the traf-
ficking of controlled substances in the DTES . . . .95 
Thus, the court finds that a mix of factors—many beyond the addicts’ con-
trol—contribute to the circumstances in which injection drug users at Insite 
find themselves. More generally, the findings establish a picture of injection 
drug addiction and use of supervised safe injection in which health issues are 
central and individual volition is downplayed. 
More specifically, these contextual findings at the trial level, and their re-
iteration and acceptance in all three judgments of the Court of Appeal, are 
significant in two particular ways: first, in terms of the larger culture shift the 
case reflects and reinforces, and second, in relation to the legal argument ac-
cepted at each level of court. 
The first aspect is usefully caught by a relatively recent paper in which 
several addiction researchers and community workers term the establishment 
of Insite “culturally momentous”.96 The researchers understand the opening 
of Insite to be the outcome of a noteworthy cultural shift: the product of a 
struggle to change key values underpinning conventional understandings of 
people with drug addiction in the DTES. Insite became possible when the 
narrative of addicts as persons “deserving of caring and life” emerged success-
ful in opposition to the conventional narrative of “law enforcement at all 
costs.”97 These authors note that in 2001, only two years before Insite 
opened, “it was difficult to find people in authority who would publicly sup-
port [supervised injection facilities] and stand by the basic assertion that ad-
diction is primarily a health and social issue, rather than principally a crimi-
nal justice issue.”98 A year later, this had changed. 
The authors rely on Bourdieu’s notion of “habitus”, of regular and observ-
able collective practices that are internalized as second nature, to understand 
                                                                    
95  PHS (SC), supra note 16 at para 89. 
96  Small, Palepu & Tyndall, supra note 11 at 73. 
97  Ibid at 74. 
98  Ibid. 
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the different lay narratives in competition over Insite.99 More specifically, 
they coin the term “addiction habitus” to capture an enduring set of lay nar-
rative responses about addiction. Included in this “addiction habitus” are the 
following sorts of beliefs: that addiction results from personal choice and 
therefore addicts are to blame for their addiction and lifestyle, that addicts 
should be made uncomfortable to discourage addiction, and that harm re-
duction services such as supervised injection sites promote addiction.100 The 
“addiction habitus” is a conventional and uninformed “gut reaction” to drugs 
and addicts characteristic of mainstream media and political responses.101 
A 1988 column in a local neighbourhood newspaper, The West End 
Times, illustrates a traditional narrative of addiction and addicts. In an article 
criticizing the idea of a SIS, the journalist, Guy Bennett, writes: “[w]hen ad-
dicts inject heroin publicly . . . they are screaming for intervention. The only 
decent response is to arrest them, detox them[,] and sentence them to 
lengthy terms of hard labour.”102 The culture change that Insite required had 
to target and alter this reflexive set of values. 
The researchers also detail the forces of change that led to revision of the 
“addiction habitus.” Some of this has already been pointed to in this essay. 
Largely, the authors talk about the peer movement (groups such as 
VANDU), the family movement (members of addicts’ families), community 
agencies (such as the Portland Hotel Society), law enforcement, academics, 
journalists, health officers, and local individual activists such as Bud Osborn, 
a social justice poet.103 These groups’ activism was so successful that when the 
safe injection facility permit application was made, there was “virtually no 
public opposition”.104 Clearly, other pieces of change were also critical.105 But 
                                                                    
99  See ibid, citing Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1990). 
100  For the longer list, see Small, Palepu & Tyndall, supra note 11 at 74. 
101  Ibid at 75. 
102  Cited in Boyd, MacPherson & Osborne, supra note 22 at 109 [emphasis in original]. 
103  See Small, Palepu & Tyndall, supra note 11 at 75–77. 
104  Ibid at 78. 
105  See generally ibid. 
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the collective and activist retelling of the social and individual import of ad-
diction, of drugs, and of SISs is an obvious piece of the political and social 
struggle that led up to the establishment of Insite. 
We can add to this story of cultural shift. The struggle over meanings 
around addiction and supervised injection that took place in the PHS case at 
both the trial and appeal levels engages a similar story of competing narra-
tives and this competition was no less important to the claimants’ success 
than the jurisprudential or doctrinal wrangling in the case. The Attorney 
General of Canada’s opposition to the claimants’ constitutional arguments 
has relied on the assertion of claims very similar to those Small and his co-
authors attribute to the “addiction habitus.” In addition to repeated reference 
to “unbridled injection of illegal drugs,”106 the federal government argued 
that “[u]nsafe injection or, for that matter, consumption by injection at all, is 
a choice made by the consumer.”107 Addicts are “those who have chosen to use 
such dangerous and harmful substances despite the legal prohibition.”108 And 
those who use Insite are described variously by the Attorney General of Can-
ada in its Supreme Court of Canada Appellant Factum as “hard-core addicts, 
the mildly addicted, frequent users or occasional users.”109 The Attorney 
General of Canada in its BCCA Factum adds, in relation to the method of 
injection, “[n]or does a user have to inject drugs, but if he or she does, the 
person can do so with a new needle, a sterilized needle, or a needle used only 
by that person.”110 Such language and framing convey a specific picture—a 
sliding scale of necessity with respect to supervised injection needs and an 
implied lower sense of urgency for many users at Insite. The clear message of 
the Crown’s argument, reinforced by this assertion of choice and lifestyle, is 
that injection drug users are authors of their own misfortune and of the 
                                                                    
106  See e.g. PHS (SC), supra note 16 (Memorandum of Argument of the Attorney General of 
Canada at paras 9, 76). 
107  PHS (CA), supra note 6 (Factum of the Appellants at para 63). 
108  Ibid (Factum of the Appellants at para 76). 
109  PHS Community Services Society v Canada (Attorney General), file no 33556 (SCC) (Fac-
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harms complained of in this case. Indeed, the heading of the section making 
this argument in the Appellant Supreme Court of Canada Factum reads: 
“The Deprivation is not Result of the Possession Law, but Individual 
Choice.”111 Thus the Attorney General of Canada has argued that there is no 
causal link between the legislation and deprivation of access to supervised 
safe injection: “[n]othing about the law prevents ‘safe’ injection”112 or “access 
to health services such as visits to health care professionals, treatment pro-
grams or needle exchanges.”113 The Attorney General of Canada concluded 
in its BCCA Factum “that addicts do indeed make choices.”114 At heart, then, 
the federal Crown’s argument is that any restriction on the interests pro-
tected under section 7 in this case is independent of state action and not the 
stuff of constitutional obligation.115 The difficulty with the BCCA decision 
is, the Attorney General of Canada argues in its Factum for the SCC appeal, 
that “the approach of the courts below . . . absolves drug users of responsibil-
ity for the choices they make.”116 
It is true the trial judge’s factual findings tell an opposing story with re-
spect to user choice and responsibility. These findings repeat the alternative 
set of meanings about addiction and its treatment that emerged from the 
community struggle to establish Insite—a tale that sidelines choice or addict 
fault and that understands the supervised injection services of Insite to be 
healthcare, addiction to be an illness, and use of Insite a necessity. Thus, the 
                                                                    
111  PHS (SCC), supra note 109 (Factum of the Appellants at para 97) [emphasis omitted]. 
112  PHS (CA), supra note 6 (Factum of the Appellants at para 63). 
113  Ibid. 
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115  Thus, the federal government argues in its SCC Appellant Factum that:  
The trial judge erred in failing to demand that the respondents show the causal link between their 
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 PHS (SCC), supra note 109 (Factum of the Appellants at para 100) [citations omitted]. 
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trial judge (and Rowles JA at the next level of court) rejected the govern-
ment’s arguments as not useful.117 Addiction and resort to Insite are not a 
“lifestyle,” not reflections of “personal preference,” and not acts of “civil dis-
obedience.”118 To the extent that choice is involved, it is between use of Insite 
and injecting in an unsafe environment. Indeed, the dissenting judge at the 
Court of Appeal is most clear in her rejection of the presence of meaningful 
choice in the situations the injection drug users face: “Their illness does not 
mean that the claimants are incapable of choice, but rather that their ability 
to choose is seriously diminished by their addiction.”119 She adds, “it is not 
the case that users can choose to be supervised while injecting drugs without 
a supervised injection site.”120 
One could also, using a different set of terms, discuss this shift in meaning 
given to addiction and supervised safe injection by the trial judge’s contextual 
findings as indicating movement between competing discourses. If we under-
stand discourses to represent ways of “giving meaning to the world and of 
organizing social institutions and processes”,121 we can then see how sets of 
interpretations of addiction and Insite were in contention. The triumph of 
the discourse around DTES addiction issues that understands these issues as 
reflective of a health care crisis and that sees use of Insite as other than a life-
style choice shows the successful resistance by a once marginalized discourse. 
The institutional support now lent this ascendant discourse by the two Brit-
ish Columbia court decisions surely is not insignificant. Indeed, it marks that 
this set of meanings has come to occupy a considerably more mainstream 
position. 
Acceptance of this particular and emergent contextual narrative about 
both addiction and resort to Insite’s services also means that, as Bois Parker 
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notes, it was a simple step to see that fundamental interests protected under 
section 7 were at stake.122 This is, then, the second aspect of how the contex-
tual findings at the trial level are significant. The contextual underpinnings 
ensure that the interests protected under section 7 are given a deeper under-
standing that extends the notions of life, liberty, and security of the person 
into territory that is more responsive to the circumstances of the vulnerable 
individuals in each case. This is simply to say, for example, in relation to the 
right to liberty, that: 
For many persons in other circumstances, the ability . . . to inject dangerous 
drugs in a certain setting would not trigger the liberty interest. But once the 
circumstances of the claimants are understood, it is clear that these are im-
portant choices which go to the dignity, autonomy and independence of 
those . . . under the heavy burden of addiction.123 
Although Bois Parker uses the language of choice here, the import of this 
quote is that it is the lack of choice, of meaningful alternatives, that makes 
the use of Insite the kind of intimate, core expression of personal liberty that 
section 7 must encompass. It is not a trivial or inconsequential or optional 
decision to seek supervision of injection drug use at Insite. And, as Smith JA 
argues on the basis of the evidence accepted at trial and in reference to an-
other of the interests section 7 protects: “the blanket prohibition against the 
possession of illicit drugs at Insite contributes to the risk of death by the 
claimants. This is the causal connection between the deprivation of life and 
[sub]section 4(1) of the CDSA”,124 and such a holding involves implicit rec-
ognition of the contextual circumstances of the drug users at Insite. 
More specifically, the activists’ narrative about addiction, Insite, and ad-
dicts enables the trial judge’s holding that all three interests protected under 
section 7 are implicated by subsections 4(1) and 5(1).125 The right to life is 
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engaged because the risk of mortality from overdose is managed within In-
site.126 The right to liberty is infringed because the federal statute presents 
Insite users with possible prosecution and imprisonment for possession of 
illegal substances.127 By impeding the right to make a choice to minimize po-
tential hazards of overdose and other serious illness through use of Insite, the 
CDSA further implicates the right to liberty. Security of the person is threat-
ened because the CDSA has the effect of denying access to a health care facil-
ity where serious health risks associated with addiction are diminished. Thus, 
each of the interests in section 7 is engaged. And, each engagement employs 
assumptions about Insite and healthcare and addiction and illness that flow 
out of the activists’ set of meanings. 
Pitfield J went on to rule that such infringements were arbitrary, or in the 
alternative either grossly disproportionate or overbroad, such that the in-
fringements were not in accordance with the principles of fundamental jus-
tice.128 This conclusion was upheld by two of the three judges at the Court of 
Appeal, at least to the extent that the infringements were not in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice because of overbreadth and being 
grossly disproportionate.129 
To repeat, critical to this result is the trial court’s acceptance of rich and 
detailed contextual argument. Acceptance of addiction as an illness and of 
the use of injected prohibited drugs as a material part of the illness and thus 
other than a “lifestyle choice” enables the trial judge and Rowles JA at the 
Court of Appeal to distinguish the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R 
v Malmo-Levine; R v Caine.130 In Malmo-Levine the drug use at issue was 
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understood by the Court to be purely recreational and access to healthcare 
for the illness of addiction was not involved.131 By confirming a picture of 
addiction and Insite that conforms to the political and community culture 
shift that allowed Insite to open, the judgments cast in authoritative voice the 
larger activist politics of SISs. Thus, the legal activism that was the catalyst 
for this case potentially reinforces the political and social activism of com-
munity advocates that preceded the case. The messages about addiction, su-
pervised injection, and addicts that underpin the context affirmed by the 
trial court are not trivial nor is their import inconsequential.132 
General popular response to the case was mixed, but at the local level, at 
least, it was largely supportive.133 A recent Angus Reid poll shows that a ma-
jority (68 per cent) of British Columbians support Insite and oppose the fed-
eral government’s attempt to shut it down.134 British Columbia was the only 
province in which there was such support—the opinion in most other prov-
inces was largely split. As well, 58 per cent of respondents in British Colum-
bia expressed opposition to the court action.135 Indeed, the success of Van-
                                                                                                                                               
In my opinion, the Malmo-Levine decision, concerned with the use of marijuana for purely recrea-
tional purposes, does not resolve the issues raised by the PHS and VANDU actions, concerned as 
they are with the health care of addicts resorting to a continuum of services. 
 PHS (SC), supra note 16 at para 137. 
131  See PHS (SC), ibid at paras 135–37; PHS (CA), supra note 6 at para 27. 
132  Also rejected by both levels of court is the federal government’s argument that the issue is 
a purely political one: that it engages merely the choice between “competing policy op-
tions with respect to the problem of drug abuse” (PHS (SCC), supra note 109 (Factum of 
the Appellants at para 3)). 
133  Jenny Kwan, an NDP MLA, authored a private member’s bill with the purpose of affirm-
ing that Insite was a healthcare facility, that the care and treatment delivered at Insite was 
incidental to the provincial health legislation and part of the Province’s exclusive jurisdic-
tion over healthcare. See Bill M-214, Supervised Injection Facility Designation Act, 4th 
Sess, 38th Parl, British Columbia, 2008 (first reading 21 May 2008). 
134  See Todd Coyne, “More than two-thirds of BC residents back Insite” The Vancouver Sun 
(29 July 2010) A8. 
135  British Columbians scored above the national average in awareness of the kinds of services 
available at Insite. However, they were the most misinformed about the provision of 
drugs. Thirty per cent believed that drugs were provided, although they are not. Ibid. 
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couver’s Insite—both practically and legally—has encouraged calls for super-
vised injection sites elsewhere in Canada.136 
V. CHOICE AND RIGHTS 
I turn now to the last part of my argument, the concern that there may be a 
less progressive side to this particular contextualized discussion of section 7 
rights. Specifically, I caution against understanding “choice”—or its ab-
sence—as an essential configuring factor in rights claims under the Charter. 
By “choice,” I mean to capture the idea of individual volition, intention, or 
agency that underpins assignment of normative responsibility for outcomes 
to the individual. 
To recap, in the PHS judgments, section 7 rights are more easily claimed 
due to the trial judge’s factual findings that choice is not meaningfully impli-
cated in the claimants’ ongoing drug addiction and use of Insite’s facilities. 
This absence of choice enables a relatively uncomplicated tale of government 
interference with protected liberty, life, and security of the person. Thus, 
successful assertion of section 7 rights in this case relies on the factual find-
ings that individual blameworthiness or wilful choice is not a significant fac-
tor in generating the harm about which the claimants complain. But, by us-
ing an understanding of addiction and Insite use that removes complainant 
choice from the calculus of reasonable responsibility for the outcome at issue, 
the courts leave open the possibility that the presence of choice—in another 
scenario—might result in just the kind of disentitlement for which the gov-
ernment pleads in this case. This would be an unfortunate direction for the 
jurisprudence to take and certainly challenging to crafting a social justice 
reach for Charter rights. 
It would be troubling because attentiveness to choice—its absence or 
presence—implies a model of individual accountability and corresponding 
lack of state responsibility that ill fits progressive rights protections. It cannot 
be the case that there is state obligation only where the individual claimant 
                                                                    
136  See e.g. “Quebec moving towards opening safe-injection sites” Canadian Press (16 July 
2008); Tara Brosnan, “Support for safe injection sites: Positive studies might not be 
enough to get Quebec on board” The McGill Daily (1 February 2010), online: <http:// 
www.mcgilldaily.com>. 
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cannot be understood to have made avoidable choices that resulted in the 
outcome at issue. Rights under the Charter must do more than simply aban-
don the unfortunate—however implicated in that misfortune—to their own 
miserable fates. If not, rights analysis will ignore the clear message of so much 
social theory that individual actions and choices are meaningfully con-
strained, shaped, and made possible by larger systemic norms, structures, and 
institutions. Simply put, individual choice is always compromised by historic 
and current material, and symbolic systems. Sandra Fredman thus refers to 
the “social meaning of choice”137 and Diana Majury to the necessity of a 
“more sceptical, more problematized approach to choice.”138 Consequently, 
individual circumstances reflect a complicated “intermingling among issues 
of agency, exposure, and vulnerability.”139 Simple causal invocation of 
“choice” reduces this matrix to a false simplicity. 
The configured and contingent character of choice means that the crite-
rion of choice is poorly fingered as a feature relevant to foreclosing or deter-
mining a rights analysis. It is so for both pragmatic and principled reasons. 
Pragmatically, judges are not best suited to or situated for any disentangling 
and analysis of social and individual factors that shape and limit choice. This 
judicial inability tells most true in relation to those individuals most margin-
alized or disadvantaged in Canadian society, those individuals whose social, 
economic, and cultural features are likely far from the typical biographical 
facts of the average Canadian judge. The rights claims of these individuals 
thus risk being read in light of inaccurate depictions of choice and agency, as 
the vulnerabilities and constraints of marginality and extreme disadvantage 
may be the most difficult for the judges who sit in determination of these 
rights claims to discern and appreciate.140 Thus, it seems unwise to include an 
                                                                    
137  Sandra Fredman, supra note 4 at 14. 
138  Diana Majury, “Women are Themselves to Blame: Choice as a Justification for Unequal 
Treatment” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M Kate Stephenson, eds, Making Equality 
Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) 
209 at 215. 
139  Robert RM Verchick, “Katrina, Feminism, and Environmental Justice” (2008) 13 Car-
dozo JL & Gender 791 at 800. 
140  See Margot Young, “Unequal to the Task: ‘Kapp’ing the Substantive Potential of Section 
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element in rights analysis that promises to be often misread and thus mis-
used, particularly in relation to those most in need of their rights. 
On a more principled basis, choice—even a reasonable finding of the 
availability of meaningful choice—should perhaps never let the state off the 
hook for obligations under section 7. Assuming that it were reasonably pos-
sible to ascertain when choice was meaningfully available to avoid or shape 
the situation of which the rights claimant complains, nonetheless, it is not 
clear that such choice or agency should matter. Instead, the focus should be 
on the state restriction at issue. In PHS, this restriction is, of course, the 
criminalization of addict’s access to the health care Insite offers. This harm to 
the interest protected by the Charter persists, regardless of whether or not 
the complainants have other reasonable possibilities for supervised safe injec-
tion. 
By focusing too much on choice or agency, courts risk, in the words of 
political theorist Elizabeth Anderson, neglect of “the distinctively political 
aims of equalitarianism” relevant to both equality rights and liberty rights.141 
Anderson posits the notion of a “democratic equality” that, characteristic of a 
just society, grants to all citizens “effective access to the social conditions of 
their freedom at all times”,142 and “neither presume[s] to tell people how to 
use their opportunities nor attempt[s] to judge how responsible people are 
for choices that lead to unfortunate outcomes.”143 Despite how individuals 
arrived at being vulnerable to state imposition of constraints on fundamental 
freedoms, rights protections should apply.  The state is correspondingly obli-
gated on the basis of substantive theories of equality and citizenship alone, 
regardless of individual complainant culpability or blamelessness. 
Certainly, such sidelining of choice is a significant challenge to traditional 
understandings of the public/private divide and to a more classical, or neo- 
liberal sense of the role of the state in addressing inequalities and limitations 
of freedoms. But the idea of a non-political, certain, or determinate divide 
                                                                                                                                               
15” (2010) 50 Sup Ct L Rev 183 at 197. 
141  Elizabeth S Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality” (1999) 109 Ethics 287 at 288. 
142  Ibid at 289. 
143  Ibid. 
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between public action and private action has little theoretical currency any 
more.144 This theoretical critique of the distinction should be extended to 
doctrinal consideration of individual and state action notions under substan-
tive rights analysis as well.145 A minimal state assigned little role in or respon-
sibility for addressing equality and liberty harms in Canadian society is fun-
damentally opposite to any robust vision of social justice achieved through 
rights entitlements. 
The critique of the relevance of choice is also a challenge to the picture of 
the citizen that has emerged as dominant in current, mainstream neo-liberal 
policy and politics. Neo-liberalism instructs individuals “to become self-
critical, to take personal responsibility for their lives, to adapt specific prac-
tices of self-regulation and improvement, and to embrace entrepreneurial and 
materialistic self-identities.”146 The citizen of the neo-liberal state is wilful, 
self-actualizing—the creator of his or her own life chances and circum-
stances.147 This is, political scientist Janine Brodie tells us, the “new vocabu-
lary of governance.”148 To this citizen is owed not social justice, but rather 
justice more individually and thinly understood: economic reward and as-
signment of societal resources based importantly on individual accomplish-
ment, strategic, and prudent choice.149 Equally, bad choices and poor out-
comes are also the individual’s responsibility, threatening disentitlement from 
collective or state consideration and compensation. The result is that “struc-
turally disadvantaged groups are ‘collectively individualized’ in popular cul-
tural representations, in citizenship discourses, and in public policy”150 Social 
                                                                    
144  See e.g. Susan B Boyd, ed, Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and 
Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). 
145  Certainly, this should be the case at least after the strictures of section 32 of the Charter 
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146  Howard, supra note 121 at 5. 
147  See Janine Brodie, “The Social in Social Citizenship” in Engin Fahri Isin, ed, Recasting the 
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148  Janine Brodie, “The New Social‘isms’: Indivdualization and Social Policy Reform in Can-
ada” in Howard, Contemporary, supra note 121, 153 at 157. 
149  See ibid. 
150  Brodie, supra note 147 at 42. 
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problems are seen as individual failings and the systemic construction of vul-
nerabilities or constraints is rendered irrelevant and thus unremarkable. The 
emphasis is on finding personal causes and responses to what are, in effect 
and under another analysis, collective social problems. This picture thus pos-
its a “biographical solution” to and explanation for our problems or disad-
vantage.151 But as already aired, such an understanding of citizenship, and of 
action and possibility, misdescribes how individuals, particularly those la-
bouring under conditions of disadvantage and marginalization, experience 
and live their lives. Erasure of larger systemic conditions, constraints, and 
structures as important features of individual and collective circumstances 
simply ensures that points of access for effective and just redistributive collec-
tive intervention are made invisible or politically unlikely. And social justice 
will continue to elude our society or, at least, will not be substantively ad-
vanced by Charter litigation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There are other observations appropriate to the legal and social issues en-
gaged by the Insite case. The physical establishment of Insite—that is, the 
facility as a “site”—represents a not insignificant spatial re-arrangement in 
the DTES that changes the political and social landscape of Vancouver. And, 
by bringing into “sight” a more focused presence of an otherwise more dis-
persed (albeit nonetheless concentrated in the lanes and alleys of the DTES) 
marginalized population, Insite raises levels of consciousness around drug 
addiction and poverty—and our response to these things—in Vancouver’s 
urban core. These are important features attached to the opening of this safe 
injection site, aspects that are cemented, as well as enhanced, by the victory 
of the rights claimants at the two levels of court in PHS and the publicity 
surrounding such success. 
Certainly, the judgments and, as I have tried to show, their understanding 
of drug addiction and use of Insite, model a more inclusive consideration in 
constitutional rights analysis of the different life courses and options of some 
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of the more disadvantaged and disregarded citizens. The understanding of 
addiction as a disability in human rights and health literature is long stand-
ing. The extension of this to local politics and its expression in the output of 
courts as they focus on poverty and injection drug users is key. The case is 
thus, as already mentioned, an appropriate one to include in any discussion 
foregrounding our legal system’s capacity to encompass diversity. Our courts 
must be attentive in applying and expanding rights protection under the 
Charter to the ways in which individual agency and action cannot be simply 
and straightforwardly signalled or sited. And they must understand how con-
text subtly but powerfully shapes rights claims and state obligations under 
the Charter. But, perhaps ironically, the courts’ method in this case, if read 
too narrowly, risks future judicial insensitivity to difference and disadvan-
tage. 
The concern about individual choice or agency disentitling claimants 
from rights protections has been raised already in relation to equality chal-
lenges under section 15 of the Charter.152 In that context, this kind of argu-
ment advanced by government, and on occasion accepted by courts,153 has 
rendered section 15 rights less hospitable territory for rights claimants. It has, 
quite simply, compromised the ability of section 15 analysis to recognize the 
systemic and substantive inequalities that shape the circumstances of some of 
our most disadvantaged citizens.154 It would be a shame if the promise of sec-
tion 7 as more fertile ground for social and economic rights is sapped by the 
reoccurrence in that context of the same unnuanced notions of agency and of 
state responsibility.155 
Thus judicial judgment in this case is correct in dismissing the notion of 
individual choice as determinative of the rights claim here. Future cases must 
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read this dismissal expansively. There needs to be judicial recognition of the 
unsuitability of choice generally as a reliable metric for determination of in-
dividual as opposed to state responsibility under a rights analysis. If choice is 
allowed to function as a bar to section 7 actions, attempts to broaden the 
scope of Charter analysis to encompass the most pressing needs of social jus-
tice in the language of Charter rights may be forced, once again, to reconsider 
the effective entry point for such concerns into Charter protections. 
 
